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CAPACITY OF PLAINTIFF-STOCKHOLDER
TO TERMINATE A STOCKHOLDER'S SUIT
CHESTER B. McLAUGHLINt
THE STOCKHOLDER'S suit is a favorite device for transferring the
burden of losses from the equity interest of a corporation to the man-
agement In boom times, with dividends and stock market prices rising
steadily, the management of a corporation could make its decisions vith-
out the restraint of critical scrutiny by litigious stockholders: stockholders
then generally ignored the issues of managerial power involved in -fa-
miliar schemes of expansion, and obediently forwarded their proxdes
for the annual meeting. During the lean years, however, punctuated
as they have been with official publicity for the scandals of Frenzied
Finance, stockholders have swarmed to the courts for recoupment of
their losses.
The recent histo-y of most corporations contains one or more occa-
siois when managerial power was exercised with questionable wisdom.
Properties have, for example, been acquired at far above a conserva-
tive valuation; managements have conferred special privileges and bonuses
upon themselves, or diverted some of the corporation's assets.
The injury resulting from such conduct is regarded as affecting only
the corporation,' which has a right of action against its officers for their
breaches of duty and against any third parties privy to the transaction.'
Although the stockholder may in fact be injured directly by the cor-
porate loss, he is deemed not to have an individual right to recover
damages for his losses from anybody2-unless the wrongdoer's breach
of a duty to the corporation also breached a duty owed to the stock-
holder directly.3
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1. Kelly v. Dolan, 218 Fed. 966 (E. D. Pa. 1914), aff'd, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C.A.
3d, 1916) ; Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (1915) ; Continental Securities
v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7, 99 N. E. 138 (1912).
2. Hodge v. Meyer, 252 Fed. 479 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Eldred v. Ripley, 97 IlL.
App. 503 (1901); Converse v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 209 Mas. 539, 95 . E.
929 (1911); Bartlett v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N. . 452
(1915); Niles v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R., 176 N. Y. 119, 63 N. E. 142 (1903);
Hayden v. Perfection Cooler Co., 227 Mass. 5S9, 116 N. . 871 (1917). See Glenn,
The Stockholder's Suit- Corporate and Indiv'dual Grievances (1924) 33 Y.u L J.
580. In these cases, where there is only this indirect injury, the stockholder has no
individual right of action, even though the wrongful acts may have been done with
the design and malicious intent of injuring him. Wells v. Dane, 101 Me. 67, 63 At.
324 (1905).
3. Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522 (C. C.A. 6th, 1S97); Matter of Auditore,
249 N. Y. 335. 164 N. F. 242 (1928); General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N. Y. 18,
421
422 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46: 421
Under suitable circumstances, however, the stockholder can assert a
corporate right of action for the corporation, via the familiar pattern
of the stockholder's suit, when the management's decision not to press
for recovery on the corporate claim was not made in good faith as a
matter of business judgment, but was shaped by what courts will call
gross inattention to business, or disloyal sympathies with those who
owed the corporation reparation.4 The stockholder's suit in general is
based on this preliminary concept of a breach of trust by corporate
officers towards the corporation as a whole in their failure to pursue
a corporate claim.5
The stockholder is required .substantially to exhaust his corporate
remedies: that is, to make specific demand on the management that the
action be prosecuted0 unless such demand would be futile, as when the
board of directors is controlled by those whose acts are being impeached,'
or has already ratified the acts complained of." Having satisfied this
requirement, the stockholder sues, representing all the stockholders,' to
enforce the corporate cause of action, joining the corporation as party
defendant.' 0 The corporation is joined for two reasons: first to be a
109 N. E. 96 (1915); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. 1090
(1906) (violation of plaintiff's pre-emptive rights); Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
965.
4. See Kelly v. Dolan, 233 Fed. 635, 638 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918) ; Whitten v. Dabney,
171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (1915) ; Byers v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 22, 21 Pac. 894 (1889) ;
Planten v. National Nassau Bank, 174 App. Div. 254, 259, 160 N.Y. Supp. 297,
302 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 677, 116 N. E. 1070 (1917) ; See also Comment
(1936) 45 YALE L. 3. 649, 666; Glenn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 588.
5. 'See Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 144 Fed. 763, 771 (C. C. A. 8th,
1906); Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 27 Fed. 625, 630 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1886); Shaw v. Davis, 78 Md. 308, 316, 28 Ati. 619, 621 (1894); RoERLIcH, LAW
AND PacrIcE oF CoRPoRTr CoNTROL (1933) 99.
6. Bartlett v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N. E. 452 (1915).
If the corporation is in receivership, the demand is to be made on the receiver. Kelly v.
Dolan, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C.A. 3d, 1916).
7. Forbes v. Wilson, 243 Fed. 264 (N. D. Ohio 1917); Brewer v. Boston Theatre,
104 Mass. 378 (1870); Daniels v. Briggs, 279 Mass. 87, 180 N. E. 717 (1932); Glenn
v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 103 Atl. 340 (1918).
8. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany, etc. R. R., 213 U. S. 435 (1909); Hawes
v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1881); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7,
17, 99 N. E. 138 (1912); McCrea v. Robertson, 192 N. Y. 150, 154, 84 N. E. 960,
961 (1908); Byers v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 22, 21 Pac. 894 (1889).
9. Zinn v. Baxter, 65 Ohio St. 341, 62 N. E. 327 (1901); Glenn, isupra note 2,
at 583.
10. Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1873); Corey v. Independent Ice Co.,
226 Mass. 391, 115 N. E. 488 (1917); Greaves v. Gouge, 69 N. Y. 154 (1877);
Security Trust Co. v. Pritchard, 201 App. Div. 142, 194 N.Y. Supp. 486 (4th Dep't
1922) ; Kelly v. Thomas, 234 Pa. 419, 83 Adt. 307 (1912). In England, a realistic vicw
of the situation is trken and the corporation joined as party plaintiff. Duckett v. Grover,
6 Ch. D. 82 (1877).
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party to the suit, so that recovery can run in its favor, and so that it
may be bound by the adjudication;"1 and secondly to satisfy the under-
lying feeling that the stockholder's suit contains two causes of action:
one by minority stockholders against the corporation for a breach of
duty in failing, through its management, to prosecute a corporate right,
and another, the corporation's cause of action against third persons,
which can be considered only if the stockholder prevails in the first.'2
The stockholder's suit is thus a derivative action, for the plaintiff-
stockholder is attempting to enforce a cause of action belbnging wholly
to another party and does not stand to gain individually by a favorable
judgment;13 he has merely "derived" the right to sue by virtue of being
a stockholder and any recovery accrues to the corporation.' 4 The action
is also representative in that it is brought on behalf of a "class,'--the
other stockholders, but it is not to be confused with other types of
representative actions in which the plaintiff has a personal claim at issue
and will profit directly from a favorable judgment.r0
The stockholder's suit is commonly used as a check on the managerial
discretion of corporate directors, and a means of restoring the value
of corporate holdings when there is a difference in interest between
management and equity-holders, or between minority and majority.
Although it is an erratic instrument for achieving these ends, it is the
most effective one available, and is therefore frequently employed."0
One of the important legal problems recurringly presented by its use
centers around the status of the plaintiff-stockholder: what degree of
11. Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1873) ; Landis v. Sea Isle City Hotel
Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 654, 33 At!. 964 (1896) ; (1934) 44 Ytax L. J. 1091.
12. See Cantor v. Sachs, 162 At!. 73, 76. (Del. Ch. 1932); BAUANuranE, M=AILtt
o" Co'oRATIoN LA-w AND PRACTICE (1930) § 186.
13. Cf. Dickinson v. Consolidated Traction Co., 114 Fed. 232, 239 (C. C.D. LT. 3.
1902) ; Dana v. forgan, 232 Fed. 85, 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; 13 FsxrcnER, Cvctonr.
.OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1931) § 5939.
14. Davis v. Peabody, 170 Mass. 397, 49 N. F- 750 (1S93); Landis v. Sea Isle
City Hotel Co., 53 N. 3. Eq. 654, 33 Ati. 694 (1895); Zinn v. Baxter, 65 Ohio St.
341, 62 N. . 327 (1901) ; Glenn, op. cit. slpra note 2, at 5S0.
15. See Comment (1934) 34 Cot.. L. REv. 11S, 119 and cases there cited. A personal
claim of the stockholder-plaintiff generally cannot be asserted in conjunction with the
corporate claim before the court in the derivative action. Brock v. Poor, 216 N. Y. 337,
11I N. E. 229 (1915) ; cf. Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 1 N. B. 663 (1835).
The most common representative actions in which plaintiff and the "class" members
have a personal claim at issue are those by creditors as for appointment of a receiver
for their debtor [Union Trust Co. v. Jones, 16 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).], or to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance [Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1235)], or to
enforce stockholders' statutory liability [Hirschfeld v. Fitzgerald, 157 N. Y. 165, 51 N. F.
997 (189)].
16. See Simpson, Fifk, Years of American Eqily, (1936) 50 Hanv. L E%. 171,
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control is he permitted over the action he has instituted? And what
effect can his conduct of the suit have on the corporate right?
There is no doubt that a final judgment in a derivative suit" (as
well as in one where the plaintiff suing on behalf of a class also has
a personal claim at issue)"8 is res judicata and bars other stockholders
from pursuing the same corporatecause of action, in the absence of fraud
or collusion.'" But there is no simple formula which describes the per-
missible extent of the plaintiff's control oyer the suit prior to the rendition
of final judgrhent.
In the first place, what is the effect of the commencement of the
action on the corresponding rights of the other stockholders? Is the
plaintiff constituted the sole representative of the class by his decision
to litigate the corporate right, in that no other stockholder may com-
mence a similar action while his is pending? 'Prior to the institution of
suit, all stockholders share the same privilege to bring an action on
behalf of the corporation;" ° but, when the machinery of suit on behalf
of the corporation has been set in motion by one stockholder, the privi-
leges of the others to do likewise may be viewed as suspended.2 The
equitable purposes, for which the stockholder's privilege to sue is recog-
nized, have been temporarily satisfied. Since bringing a suit "by one
stockholder merely stispends and does not extinguish the privileges of
other stockholders to sue, if the suit is discontinued by the plaintiff stock-
holder, the rights of other stockholders to commence action on behalf
of the corporation are revived. Considering the institution of an action
by one stockholder as a temporary bar to another suit can, it appears,
17. Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); Alexander v. Donohue, 143
N. Y. 203, 38 N. E. 263 (1894); Hochman y. Mortgage Finance Corp., 289 Pa. 260,
137 At!. 252 (1927); Fahrenwald v. Spokane Savings Bank, 179 Wash. 61, 35 P.
(2d) 1117 (1934) ; Ro ,acir, op. cit. supra note 5, at 166.
18. Kerr v. Blodgett, 48 N. Y. 62 (1871) ; Hirschfeld v. Fitzgerald, 157 N. Y. 166,
51 N. E. 997 (1898); Piedmont Life Insurance Co. v. Maury, 75 Va. 508 (1881).
19. Beers v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 286 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Wil-
loughby v. Chicago Junction Ry., 50 N. J. Eq. 656, 25 Atl. 277 (1892); see Gerith
Realty Co. v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N. Y. Supp.
655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934),
aff'd, 266 N. Y. 525, 199 N. E. 518 (1935).
20. Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (1915); Gerith Realty Corp.
v. Normandie National Securities Corp.; 154 Misc. 615, 276 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Sup.
Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266
N. Y. 525, 199 N. E. 518 (1935); Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp. 240 App.
Div. 242, 269 N. Y. Supp. 360 (2nd Dep't 1934), leave to appeal denied, 241 App. Div.
745, 270 N. Y. Supp. 961 (2nd Dep't 1934).
21. Goodbody v. Delaney, 80 N. J. Eq. 417, 419, 83 Atl. 988 (1912). But see
Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 196, 1 N. E. 663, 668 (1885). Cf. 13 FLErCenvE,
op. cit. supra note 13, at § 6019, n. 83.
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work no injustice to the would-be plaintiff-stockholder. He can always
intervene and be joined as a party plaintiff in the original action, thus'
gaining an equal voice with the original plaintiff in its conduct.2 In the
absence of collusion, the right of the corporation is before the court
in a stockholder's suit just as completely as if the corporation itself
had instituted the proceeding; if in the same tribunal a second stock-
holder's action is commenced, duplicate litigation of the same claim
results, so that the defendant would seem entitled to a dismissal as of
right on the grournd of another action pending.
23
Nevertheless the New York Appellate Division has recently supported
the contrary view that dismissal under these circumstances is a matter
of discretion for the court trying the second stockholder's suit. In that
case a stockholder had brought action on' behalf of a corporation against
its directors, alleging mismanagement and dissipation of corporate as-
sets. Another stockholder's action was already awaiting trial on the
identical issues, and the defendants made a motion to dismiss the new
action as of right. The court took the position that inasmuch as each
stockholder had an inherent right to sue, independent of any other stock-
holder's right to sue, the bringing of suit by one had no automatic effect
upon the rights of the others; and the court claimed discretion either to
allow the two suits to continue separately or to dismiss the secofid one
depending on whether undue multiplicity was involved.2-
The .court justified its refusal to make the institution of one stock-
holder's action a bar, even though merely temporary, to the commence-
ment of any other, on the ground that otherwise "the door is open to
collusive actions." Ability to intervene and revival of the right of
other stockholders to sue if the present plaintiff failed to prosecute the
action to judgment were dismissed as insufficient safeguards. "He
22. See McAlpin v. Universal Tobacco Co., 57 At. 413 (N. J. Eq. 1904); Good-
body v. Delaney, 80 N. 3. Eq. 417, 420, 83 Atl. 98S, 9S9 (1912) ; Grant v. Greene Con-
solidated Copper Co., 169 App. Div. 206, 212, 154 N. Y. Supp. 596, 601 (1st Dep't
1915), aff'd, 223 N.Y. 655, 119 N.E. 1046 (1918); Gerith v. Normandie National"
Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App.
Div. 717, 269 N.Y. Supp. 1007 (Ist Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 525, 199 N.E. 513
(1935); cf. Southern Pacific R. R. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 490 (1919).
23. See Alpert v. Mercury Publishing Co., 272 Mass. 39, 41, 172 N. E. 221, 222
(1930); Goodbody v. Delaney, 80 N. 3. Eq. 417, 419, 83 At!. 983 (1912); cf. Gerith
Realty Corp. v. Normandie National Securities Corp. 154 Misc. 615, 276 N. Y. Supp.
655 (Sup. Ct 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934),
aff'd, 266 X. Y. 525, 199 N. E. 518 (1935). But cf. Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading
Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360 (2nd Dep't 1934), lcavo to appeal dcnied,
241 App. Div. 745, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (2nd Dep't 1934).
24. Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N. Y. Supp.
360 (2nd Dep't 1934), leave to appeal denied, 241 App. Div. 745, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007
(2nd Dep't 1934).
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(plaintiff) may omit from his complaint material allegations which have
been discovered by another more vigilant and industrious . . . There
is nothing to prevent defendants, before judgment, from buying their
peace with the plaintiffs by means of a private settlement, leaving other
stockholders to seek their remedy by a new action, if the statute of
limitations has not run against them . . There is no requirement
that the stockholder who sues or the defendants shall give notice of the
suit to other stockholders . . It would be very easy for offending
officers and directors to obtain a friendly stockholder to begin an action
and to suppress all information on the subject."2"
However, if the plaintiff-stockholder will be effectively prevented from
conducting the suit so as materially to, prejudice the corporate claim,
then there would be little basis in fact for the New York court's denial
that the institution of one stockholder's suit should temporarily bar
another, a ruling which fails to protect defendants against a multiplicity
of actions. If, on the other hand, it is not possible to insure adequate
presentation of the corporate claim in the stockholder's action, the rea-
sons advanced by the Appellate Division in support of its position seem
persuasively to justify its view that the beginning of one derivative
suit does not suspend the power of other stockholders to do likewise.
Generally speaking a stockholder-plaintiff can prejudice the cause of
action in two ways: one by discontinuing the suit, and second by com-
promising the suit and obtaining the entry of a consent judgment. The
discontinuance may result in the surrender of an advantage already
gained in the litigation, or even if ostensibly effected without prejudice
may subject the cause of action to the statute of limitations. Compro-
mising a suit and entering a consent judgment, in the absence of a
showing of fraud or collusion, destroys a right of action.2
It is, however, hardly desirable as a matter of policy to force every
stockholder's action to be carried through to judgment. Like other liti-
gation, the stockholders' suit is an expensive luxury, especially for the
stockholder-plaintiff who cannot recover direct personal benefit from
the action and is even unable to obtain reimbursement for costs from the
corporation unless a favorable judgment is obtained.27 Since stock-
holders already are aware that they have everything to lose and nothing
to gain, if there is added to this a requirement that an action once com-
menced must always be prosecuted to final judgment, resort to the stock-
25. Id. at 247, 269 N. Y. Supp. at 367.
26. See p. 430 infra. Cf. RoERLicH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 167.
27. Decatur Mineral & Land Co. v. Palm, 113 Ala. 531, 21 So. 315 (1896);
Greenough v. Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co., 52 Idaho 599, 18 P. (2d) 288 (1933); For-
rester v. Boston and Maine Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Co., 29 Mont.
397, 74 Pac. 1088 (1904); Fitzgerald v. Bass, 122 Okla. 140, 252 Pac. 54 (1927).
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holder's suit may well be discouraged, a result to be avoided in view of
the utility of the action as the main instrument available to an oppressed
minority for curbing otherwise unlimited managerial power and for
recouping corporate losses.
Two fact situations are commonly distinguished: one where the cor-
poration acquiesces to the proposed discontinuance or settlement, and
second where the corporation opposes such action. It may be suggested
that, inasmuch as the right of action is that of the corporation, the
stockholder's power to discontinue or compromise the action is dependent
upon such consent. The materiality of the presence or absence of cor-
porate consent is, however, questionable, regardless of whether or not
the dismissal will prejudice the corporate cause of action; it is doubtftl
whether any weight should be given it at all. Since if is an integral part
of the stockholder's case that the corporation's decision not to prosecute
the action was a breach of duty, manifestly corporate consent to a dis-
missal of the bill, an empty repetition of its allegedly wrongful opinion,
is no assurance that corporate interests will not be prejudiced by a dis-
missal. When dismissal will not prejudice the corporate right of action
a stockholder may be allowed a discontinuance regardless of the cor-
poration's views, in the absence, of course, of any intervention by fellow
stockholders 8s Possibly, this privilege is clearer where the corporation
consents. But even in the absence of corporate consent, allowing the
stockholder to discontinue' in such cases imposes no burden on the
corporation or on other stockholders. It should be recalled that the
stockholder must prosecute the action at his own expense and without
hope of reimbursement from the corporation unless successful. It seems
unnecessarily harsh to force him to continue the action even when no
material harm can be done by a discontinuance and even though he may
no longer be able to finance the action or has become convinced that it
is unfounded. There is, moreover, no reason to allow the corporation
which has refused to bring the suit itself to compel the continuance of
the action at the expense of a presumably innocent stockholder by with-
holding its consent for a dismissal.
28. Witousek v. Ideal Yeast Co., 194 Iowa 47, 183 N. W. 772 (1922); lernmie
v. Wallace, 186 Ky. 459, 217 S.V. 916 (1926); Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading
Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N. Y. Supp. 360 (2nd Dep't 1934), leave to appeal denied,
241 App. Div. 745, 270 N.Y. Supp. 961 (2nd Dep't 1934); Grant v. Consolidated
Copper Co., 169 App. Div. 206, 154 N. Y. Supp. 596 (Ist De't 1915), off'd, 223 N. Y.
655, 119 N. M 1046 (1918). See also as adopting the doctrine cited in the text, 4 Cooz,
CoRaoORlons (8th ed. 1923) 3286; 13 FL=CHR, Cycr.oprmr or Co00RponTuous (1931)
§ 6019. Coitra: Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pan. 312 (1915).
29. Witousek v. Ideal Yeast Co., 194 Iowa 47, 188 N.W. 772 (1922); cf. Beadleston
v. Alley, 55 Hun 606, 7 N.Y. Supp. 747 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1889), appeal dismicsed,
119 N. Y. 659, 23 N. M 1150 (1890).
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When the proposed action of the stockholder will materially prejudice
the corporation's underlying right of action, as by surrendering an ad-
vantage already gained in the litigation, or subjecting the cause of action
to the .statute of limitations,"0 the stockholder's privilege of dismissal
is not so unambiguous, although again the assent of the corporation to
the dismissal seems immaterial. To allow the plaintiff stockholder an
unrestricted privilege of dismissal under such circumstances would make
a simple technique available to fraudulent directors whereby they could
exploit the corporation, and protect themselves against any possibility
of future liability, by having a compliant stockholder sue obscurely, and
withdraw at an appropriate time to block any further action with a plea
of the statute of limitations."'
30. For a fact situation in which the statute of limitations will apparently bar
further action after the stockholder-plaintiff has discontinued a stockholder's suit, see
Beadleston v. Alley, 55 Hun 606, 7 N.Y. Supp. 747 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1889),
appeal isimissed, 119 N. Y. 659, 23 N. E. 1150 (1890). Generally a stockholder
cannot bring a derivative action on the corporate claim after the statute of limitations
has run on it. Kelly v. Dolan, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916) ; Brinckerhoff v. Bost-
wick, 98 N. Y. 185, 1 N. . 663 (1885); Wallace v. Lincoln Savings'Bank, 89 Tenn.
630, 15 S.W. 448 (1891); cf. Backus-Brooks Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry., 21 F.
(2d) 4 (C. C.A. 8th, 1927); see Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 89 Tenn. 630,
15 S.W. 448, 453 (1891). On occasion, however, courts confusedly overlook the char-
acter of the stockholder's action and talk of the statute of limitations as running against
him so as to bar his power to bring the action, implying that the statute commences
to run from the date that the stockholder first learns of the corporate claim. Cf.
Fleming v. Black Warrior Copper Co. Amalgamated, 15 Ariz. 1, 136 Pac. 273
(1913). This would appear an unfounded position. True, the action is based in part
on breach of trust or fraud and as to this, the statute might conceivably be said to
run from the date. of the acquisition of knowledge by the stockholder-plaintiff. See
p. 422, "supra. However, it is fraud or breach of trust on the part of the corporate
management and the attempt now is not to bar action against the corporation for its
breach of trust or fraud, but to prevent any recovery from the party against whom
the corporate right lay. The entire action hinges upon that corporate right and if
it no longer exists then, clearly, the stockholder can derive no right from the corpora-.
tion on which to bring .he action. See FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 4 5886.
Since holding that the running of the statute on the corporate claim bars a deriva-
tive action may easily result in hardship, it is generally qualified in two important
respects, in "e.'-traordinary" cases, where there are unusually strong equities in favor
of the complainant: (1) If the transaction giving rise to the corporate cause of action
was hidden from the stockholders so that they could not obtain knowledge of it, their
power to bring a derivative action is not destroyed by the running of the statute of
limitations as to the corporate right. Backus-Brooks Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry.,
21 F. (2d) 4, 12 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 89 Tenn.
630, 15 S. W. 448, 453 (1891); (2) While the corporation is under the control of
those against whom the claim lies, the statute does not commence to run until this
control is terminated. Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (1915); Reich
v. Robinson, 64 Cal. App. 46, 220 Pac. 676 (1923).
31. Even though the corporate claim may not be barred by the statute of limita-
tions, yet an individual stockholder may be unable to bring a derivative action on it
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-Where a representative plaintiff has a personal claim at issue, he may
not as of right discontinue his action after the granting of an order
or decree affecting the rights of other members of the class. The entry
of an interlocutory judgment,32 or the appointment of a receiver,33 for
example, may enable other creditors to prevent a discontinuance, even
though they were not original parties to the action. There is more
reason for denying a derivative plaintiff this power of discontinuance
than for withholding it from a representative plaintiff who has, an
individual claim at stake. The possible hardship in requiring the stock-
holder to continue the litigation which he has voluntarily instituted should
not induce the court to permit him to impair the corporate cause of
action. Several courts, however, have said otherwise. Thus in the
recent Dresdner case the court remarked, although its decision turned
on another point, that in a derivative action the plaintiff may discon-
tinue even where such discontinuance is fatal to an advantage gained.m
And in an old New York case, plaintiff-stockholder was induced to with-
draw the suit in consideration of a personal payment after trial but
before the entry of judgment. The receiver of the corporation and
other stockholders sought to oppose it. Yet the court said, "The plaintiff
had the right to settle her own grievance against the parties who had
done her the alleged wrong; and it was none of the other stockholders'
business how or by what means she did it.'3a It will be observed that
because of his laches, generally arising from unreasonable delay in bringing suit after
acquiring knowledge of the existence of the claim. F-TcHER, op. di. Mipra note 13, at
§ 5874 and cases there cited. Of course, the laches of one stockholder does not bar suit by
others not similarly situated. However, by commencing an obscure action, then dis-
continuing it ostensibly without prejudice, it may be possible to taint all stockholders
with laches. The bringing of the first action may be said to be sufficient notice for
the purpose of giving all stockholders constructive knowledge of the e~xstence of a
corporate right which is not being enforced. Cf. Taylor v. South & North Alabama
R. R., 13 Fed. 152 (C. C. M.D. Ala. 1881); Williamson Croft Hat & Notion Co.,
82 W. Va. 549, 96 S. E. 929 (1918); Gils v. Elizabeth Lake Corporation, 250 Mch.
443, 220 N. W. 509 .(1930). Failure to bring a new action reasonably soon after the
discontinuance of the first action may be viewed as laches; however, no case discussing
or considering this point has been found, although some possibility of a holding to
that effect is indicated in Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N.Y. 185, 1 N. . 663, 658
(1s85).
32. Salisbury v. Binghamton Publishing Co., 85 Hun 99, 32 N. Y. Supp. 652
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1895). But cf. I; re Alpha Co. Ltd. [1903] 1 Ch. 203.
33. Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. 336 (W. D. Pa.
1891).
34. Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N. Y.
Supp. 360 (2nd Dep't 1934), leave to appeal denied, 241 App. Div. 745, 270 X. Y.
Supp. 961 (2nd Dep't 1934).
35. Beadleston v. Alley, 55 Hun 606, 7 N. Y. Supp. 747 (App. Div. 2nd Dep't
1889), appeal dismissed, 119 N. Y. 659, 23 N. E. 1150 (1890).
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the court here entirely overlooked the fact that the action had been
brought on behalf of the corporation and that no actionable injury had
been inflicted upon the plaintiif; it is difficult to understand what interest
of her own was involved to give the plaintiff an "absolute right" to
settle the derivative suit, after she had obtained a favorable decision,
especially in the face of strong objection by the representative of her
corporate principal.
The equities against allowing the stockholder-plaintiff to prejudice
the derivative right of action should be even clearer when it is proposed
that the action be settled and a consent judgment be entered. In the
absence of a showing of fraud or collusion the compromise and the
entry of a consent judgment generally destroys a right of action,30 and
fraud or collusion are exceedingly difficult to prove. To allow a single
stockholder or group of stockholders the power to make a private com-
promise of the corporate cause of action places a heavy reliance upon
their judgment (assuming its exercise in good faith), and leaves the
corporate claim (and the indirect rights of non-joining stockholders)
at the mercy of individuals who have no hope of personal recovery even
if the suit is prosecuted successfully, and who stand to suffer consider-
able losses in costs if unsuccessful; obviously a wide door is opened
to strike suits and collusive payments to stockholders which may rarely,
if ever, be recovered by the corporation.
37
Nevertheless the power of a stockholder to compromise the derivative
suit has apparently been recognized. Statements are often found to
the effect that
"It is a principle of equity practice, when a person brings a suit
in behalf of himself and such others as may wish to come in who
are similarly. situated, that the complaining stockholder controls
the case and may continue, compromise, abandon, or discontinue
it at his pleasure."38
Put such generalizations seem woefully insecure when examined, in
terms of the cases in which they appear. Not only do the facts of
cases fail to support the dicta, but the courts often confuse the author-
36. Cf. Cutter v. Arlington Casket Co., 255 Mass. 52, 151 N. E. 167 (1926);
Gerith v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N. Y. Supp. 655
(Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934)
aff'd, 266 INT.Y. 525, 199 N.E. 518 (1935); RonRLicH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 167.
37. No cases directly in point appear to exist, but analogies supporting such recovery
may perhaps be found in cases allowing recovery by a principal or employer of sums
secretly paid to and received by an agent. Cf. Donemar, Inc. v. Mallory, 252 N. Y.
360, 169 N. E. 610 (1930) ; Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell, 34 Ch. Div.
39 (1888).
38. 4 CooK, CoxoRATxoNs (8th ed. 1923) 3286.
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ities which are listed to justify their conclusion. They ignore the dis-
tinction between a derivative suit and other representative actions in
which the plaintiff has a personal claim at issue, a distinction of con-
siderable relevance to the stockholder's power to compromise stock-
holders' suits. They cite cases in which discontinuance without prejudice
has been allowed, as authority to support a compromise or prejudicial
discontinuance, problems which are of course completely different, and
which involve a consideration of the scope which should be given as
a matter of equity policy to the stockholder's capacity to influence a
corporate interest.
Certain cases are recurringly cited in support of the proposition that a
derivative plaintiff has the power to effect a binding compromise of the
cause of action. Most of them, curiously, are from New York. At the
outset, in New York, the judicial remarks on the right to compromise were
properly restricted to a settlement by a representative plaintiff who had
an individual right at issue of his own claim. Thus, in an early action
of that character, the Chancellor said, "In cases of this kind it is com-
petent for the complainant to settle with the defendants, and to with-
draw his suit, without the consent of the other creditors, at any time
before decree."" Subsequently in the leading case of Brinckerhoff v.
Bostwick, the Court of Appeals said sweepingly, "It is true, that at any
time before judgment, the original plaintiff, before the others were
made parties, could have discontinued the suit or could have settled his
individual damages with the defendants, and -have executed a release
which would have been effectual as to him."' 10 This case has frequently
been cited as an authority to support the proposition that a derivative
plaintiff may settle the suit, without reference to the fact that there
the plaintiff placed in issue both a derivative right and an individual
claim as a member of a wronged class," and that the court, in making
the generalization, was undoubtedly discussing the latter claim, for it
speaks of the plaintiff as settling "individual damages"; of course, a
derivative plaintiff has no individual damage to settle. Moreover, the
court's remarks as to the degree of control possessed by plaintiff stock-
holder over the derivative action was entirely dicta since the only point
at issue concerned the running of the statute of limitations as to inter-
vening stockholders.
Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick was followed in Hirsilfeld v. Fitzgerald, - a
case in which plaintiff representing bther creditors of a dosed bank sought
39. Innes v. Lansing, 7 Paige 5S3, SS5 (N. Y. Ch. I839).
40. 99 N. Y. 15, 194, 1 N. E. 663 (1S5).
41. This becomes especially clear from a study of reports of the same litigation
at earlier stages. See 88 N. Y. 52 (1SS2) and 34 Hun 352 (App. Div. 2nd Dep't, 1834).
42. 157 X. Y. 166, 51 N. . 997 (1898).
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to enforce stockholder's statutory liability, and thus to attain a personal
benefit. Although no question of a derivative suit was before the court
in that case, it is nevertheless cited both in New York and other juris-
dictions as an authority in connection with derivative suits, and especially
the power to compromise them.43 Thus, at a later date, in what was in
fact a derivative suit the court, after describing the "stockholder's suit"
as a "representative action" and failing to distinguish it from other
representative suits in which the plaintiff is litigating a personal claim,
states that the plaintiff "has the right to control the action or to com-
promise or discontinue it at pleasure," .and cites as controlling Brinck-
erhoff v. Bostwick and Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald.
44
The situation in New York is typical: there is a wealth of dicta in
terms broad enough to uphold the power of a plaintiff-stockholder to
settle the corporate (derivative) cause of action, but no decision square-
ly supports the proposition. In fact, no decision directly upholding the
existence of ,such a power has been found in any other jurisdiction;
and it has in several jurisdictions been flatly determined that a derivative
plaintiff has not the power to settle a corporate, controversy, at least
without the consent of the court.
43
This result is clearly sound; important reasons of corporate and
judicial policy support a denial to stockholder-plaintiffs of unrestricted
power to dispose of corporate claims. But it seems necessary to avoid
a rule which would force the stockholder to prosecute every derivative
action to final judgment: He may discontinue if he can avoid preju-
dicing the corporate right. But such discontinuance is impractical; com-
promise and settlement is more often to be preferred, especially from
the standpoint of economy in litigation, but only, however, if there is
some assurance that the compromise is adequate and fair.
Three possible courses suggest themselves as tending -to make possible
the achievement of both objectives:
1. It can be required that the proposed settlement be submitted to
all stockholders for unanimous consent. But the necessity for unanimous
43. See e.g., Johnson v. King, Richardson Co., 36 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930) ;
Bernheim v. Wallace, 186 Ky. 459, 217 S. W. 916 (1920); Goodbody v. Delaney, 80
N. J. Eq. 417, 83 Atl. 988 (1912). Similarly in textbooks, see Coox, op. cit. sapra
note 38, at 3286.
44. Grant v. Greene Consolidated Copper Co., 169 App. Div. 206, 154 N. Y. Supp.
596 (1st Dep't 1915), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 655, 119 N. E. 1046 (1918).
45. Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (1915); Beaudette v. Graham,
267 Mass. 7, 165 N. E. 671 (1929) ; cf. Cutter v. Arlington Casket Co., 255 Mass. 52,
151 .N. E. 167 (1926) ; Gerith v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615,
276 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1007
(1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 525, 199 N. E. 518 (1935). See also Comment
(1934) 34 CbL. L. Rav. 118, 126.
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consent, particularly where the corporation has many stockholders, raises
a practical obstacle which would be almost insurmountable. Further,
this plan would vest in a single stockholder an unconscionable and
potentially expensive veto power.
2. The requirement may be merely for approval of the submitted
plan by a majority vote at a meeting of stockholders. Presumably,
however, a majority of the stock is controlled by, br is at least friendly
to, the defendant direcfors, since a majority vote has placed and retained
them in office. A vote of a majority of all the stockholders in favor
of the settlement, therefore, would be not much more effective in insur-
ing an equitable compromise than a vote of the directors themselves.
On the other hand, if the stock owned or controlled by the defendant
directors were disqualified, the action of the corporation in respect-t9
the settlement would often be determined by a minority of its stock-
holders who, being opposed to the management, would probably disap-
prove of the plan regardless of its merits. This would be unfair not
only to the majority stockholders but to the corporation itself, as the
proposed settlement might well be beneficial to it.
3. Finally, the approval of the proposed settlement might be left
to the discretion of the cotirt. This method of settlement is the most
practical There seems to be no reason to doubt that the consent decree
thus entered would be binding on all stockholders;"0 so long as a final
judgment after trial obtained by a stockholder in a derivative suit binds
all other stockholders on the principle of res adjudicata, no reason ap-
pears why a consent decree should nbt in a like manner be effective to
adjudicate conclusively the cause of action when, of course, the settle-
ment is paid to the corporation.47 Because of the court suoervision over
the compromise, no valid reason exists why we should here have an
exception to the otherwise generally binding effect of consent judg-
ments. That in a non-derivative suit all parties enter into a compromise
uninfluenced by factors other than the merits of the compromise, where-
as in a derivative action, there is the probability that one of the parties,
the corporation, is dominated by the defendants is offset by the added
element of judicial supervision. For, two courses of action are open
to the court, either of which insure adequate protection of all the inter-
ests involved. It may inquire and decide whether, in proposing to enter
into the compromise for the corporation, the directors are acting op-
pressively or fraudulently, or as proper corporate representatives without
self-interest. And if the latter be determined, the court need inquire
no further into the merits of the settlement; the corporation is then as
46. See notes 36 and 44, supra.
47. See Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317 (1905); FanE=, JuDn uTs (5th
ed. 1925) 2774 and cases there cited.
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free to act as if it had been the original plaintiff. If, however, the
court has doubts as to the openmindedness of the directors, it may dis-
regard entirely the assent of the corporation, and, after examining all
the circumstances, reach an independent decision on the fairness of the
settlement.
Three cases have been found which utilize or suggest this technique.
In Whitten v. Dabney,48 a derivative suit was settled privately without
the court's approval. The court held that the position of the stockholder
plaintiff was that of a trustee for the corporation and that, as such, he
was required to submit the proposed'settlement to the court, whose duty
it was to pass upon its fairness. Likewise in Bernhein v. Wallace," a
stockholder's suit was settled privately and a decree entered by consent,
which purported to be without prejudice to certain of the corporate
rights. The appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court
which had refused to recognize the settlement. It is true that although
there was here an agreed judgment with respect to certain matters, it
purported to be without prejudice as to others. The case is important,
however, because the appellate court based its decision on the merits of
the settlement and upon its determination that the compromise. was fair
and equitable; because the court approved of the agreed judgment, even
though the corporation thereby surrendered valuable advantages pre-
viously gained in the trial of the action; and because the case is a holding
to the effect that a stockholder who was not a party to the suit and who
now sought to assert a derivative claim, was bound by the settlement.
Gerits Realty Corporation v. No rmandie National Securities Corpora-
tion raised the question under consideration squarely. In a stockholder's
derivative suit, a settlement was agreed upon between the plaintiff and
the defendant directors and was submitted to the court for its approval.
The court directed that a meeting of stockholders be held in the court-
room, at which, by a majority vote, the settlement was approved, and
after the court had taken "the utmost pains to prevent an ill advised
settlement," judgment by consent was entered. A new suit was subse-
quently commenced on the corporate cause of action by a stockholder
who had voted against the original settlement and by another who had
not been at the meeting. The court held that regardless of whether a
notice of the proposed settlement was given to all stockholders, "the
judgment in the absence of collusion or other fact showing it was
fraudulent is binding on the corporation and, incidentally, on each agent
who has the capacity to sue in the right of the corporation." This
decision was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division of a
48. 171 Cal. 621, 154 Pac. 312 (1915).
49. 186 Ky. 459, 217 S. W. 916 (1920).
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different Department from that in which the Dresdnter case was decided,
and by the Court of Appeals."
"Discretion of the court" is all too frequently the solution proposed
,.or a difficult problem. But in a stockholder's derivative suit, we have
an unusual difficulty; the good faith of all parties before the court is
uncertain. Judicial supervision appears to be the best possible means of
protecting the rights of other stockholders and creditors, absent parties
with definite and substantial interests at stake. True, when a proposed
compromise is laid before the court, it is in effect being asked to make
a finding on the merits of the stockholder's claim without the thorough
investigation of facts supposed to characterize trials. But some legal
mechanism for compromising a derivative action must be provided; it
seems preferable with so many interests at stake, to give final discretion
to the court rather than to remit the parties solely to their own judgment
and to rely entirely upon their good faith.
50. 154 Misc. 615, 276 N. Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717,
269 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 525, 199 N. . 518 (1935).
